

Proposal for a Judgement and Plan Guideline in Crisis Communication

On use: The left column contains a checklist as distillate of the analyses of the author. In my own practice I process the points of chapters I to III step by step (if there is enough time available). Each point that seems relevant is dealt with briefly in one to three sentences. On particularly delicate points (which from experience vary from crisis to crisis) the analysis intensifies. Although the list seems long at first glance, seldom are all items relevant. This considerably reduces the number of issues that actually have to be dealt with, since points are bypassed correspondingly. Basically, there is a certain residual risk of overlooking what is important here. For research in the first three chapters, it is enormously helpful if there is a specialist checklist from the industry itself, based upon earlier experiences (or, as the case may be, upon existing scenarios from risk management or from the insurer of the organisation).

In food production, different problems typically arise, from those that can be expected in automotive engineering, the computer industry or in a clinic. At the end of chapter III, there is already a fairly complete, yet compact description of position and evaluation. chapter IV is dedicated to the basic knowledge regarding the question, which goals are chosen and which measures are to be taken.

Of course there also cases where little or no time is available. This is when I try, at least in the right-hand column, to write in some keywords so as to at least avoid blunders in my haste. In the present document I have provided a few explanations in the right-hand column instead. Questions and feedback are welcome: rudi.schmidt@rudischmidt.eu

Rudi Schmidt

Check List / Items	Comments
<p>I. Grading the situation (crisis?):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. What has definitely happened already? (if needed chronological illustration) b. Which characteristics exist? c. Can the problem be grasped at short notice? d. Time pressure? e. Why are success / reputation / liquidity of the organisation influenced negatively (moral)? f. Exceptional situation? Routine is impaired? g. Target groups focus on their and other partners in the organisation: clients on sellers, analysts on IR and CFO, journalists on press office, employees on superiors h. Effects tangible: price drop, employees are addressed in a private setting due to affiliation to organisation, imminent insolvency, clients switch to competition 	<p>All participants on crisis committee have a detailed initial situation based on the first (to be adapted later if needed) position paper. Each member ensures that all the important details have been mentioned. After reading this section, each reader must have an adequate picture of the situation.</p> <p>These first items bring the crisis within reasonable reach of the top echelons of decision making: they serve as a portent of the management of the organisation and should result in appropriate use of attention and resources.</p>
<p>II. Type of crisis</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Maximal moralistic impact or do other elements dominate? b. False / true rumour? 	<p>Grading the type of crisis serves as research in editorial archives (e.g. www.genios.de) and the following identification and grading of typical patterns. Apart from the common factors of crisis communication, the types of</p>

- c. With human suffering / sacrifice or without?
- d. Objective error: product error (production/manufacturing), warning with product recall, processing error, research error (e.g. balance, budget), processing error (e.g. incorrect bills)
- e. Statutory violations (e.g. systematic corruption, cartel law, balance sheet law, criminal law)
- f. Misconduct of individual employees (corruption, prostitution, theft, embezzlement, speculation)
- g. Catastrophe, tragic event
- h. (Economic) imbalance

crisis have their respective characteristic features. A product recall is a typical scenario with many recurring elements, which quickly stand out in an overview of similar past cases. The course of things however, is decided in important details by cartel law crises, food scandals or environmental catastrophes.

Particular attention is given to the public expectations of the moral conduct of an organisation. Decision-makers do not always appropriately classify these expectations when managing a crisis under pressure. Compared to incorrect billing, public animal abuse or crimes against child victims count morally, as more reprehensible. With accounting, legally or commercially oriented consultants however might arrive at a differently weighted result. This often leads to loss of official position, because stakeholders such as shareholders, politicians and society together with the media, force the hand of supervisory bodies. A conscientious crisis communicator therefore handles the moral factor as front man at least once. It must be absolutely ensured that attorney correspondence or similar documents leave the office only after being released by the communications manager. Experience shows that such (legally correct) writings are often an easy target for the media. Lawsuits that are finally won after many years, are of as little help to the board at the general meeting as they are to the families of the organisation members (and their children) with

	regard to gossiping neighbours.
<p>II. Situation assessment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Presence of immediate threats? b. What is a medium-term threat? c. In which phase are we now? (opening, middle game, endgame) d. Who is vulnerable? Who was addressed? Who are attacks directed at? e. Who is carrying out the attacks? f. How are the attacks carried out? What does the report focus on – and what not? Why not? What use could be drawn from this? g. Is there (already) knowledge of our own mistakes? h. Which countermeasures were introduced and what is the implementation plan like? i. Which parallels are there to known situations from research, teaching, industry, competitor's experiences and our own practice in the past? j. Has the scenario already been described or analysed in the organisation (in the company risk management documents)? k. Substantive balance of power organisation – medium / agitator? l. Is there a driving force behind the reporting? Is this force acting openly or covertly? 	<p>In crisis communication, every plan (move, action) should rest on a solid foundation and be based on a realistic situation assessment and evaluation. A few general evaluation criteria can be taken from chess for estimation,ⁱ and in conclusion by analogy the following can be deduced therefrom: 1. presence of immediate threats. 2. balance of power. 3. position and threat of organisation and its management. 4. mastery of central themes and credibility in public. 5. strong and weak points to be considered, in own and public arguments etc. 6. structure of own organisation, plus development and availability of own (allied) and "adversarial" resources.</p> <p>Prior to evaluation of details, the situation should be analysed for patterns and structures. Similar cases can be detected by means of editorial archives and search engines: Are there any experiences with constellations of similar players? Are we in a "typical phase" (e.g. initial phase) with our own laws? Broad media front or solitary editor with exclusive story?</p> <p>In every strategy, the first question is whether there are any immediate threats, which would have fatal consequences if overlooked. Both in military history and also in chess, there are countless examples for such mistakes. "Chess blindness designates the overlooking of</p>

- m. Who is regularly responsible for the relationship with this driving force? How is the communication with this driving force currently?
- n. Is the driving force addressing other attack goals in the organisation in the meantime?
- o. Who has control over documents, figures, data, and facts?
- p. Which media are acting?
- q. Which characteristics distinguish media?
- r. Reporting express, objective, subjective?
- s. How relevant are the users of this media for us?
- t. Which weaknesses and strengths do the argument of the media / "attackers" have?
- u. Which matters did the media / "attackers" start with – and which not? Why?
- v. Which weaknesses and strengths does our argument have?
- w. How freely can we act? Whose reputation weighs more? Who is more credible? Which arguments have most impact? Are there third parties with high credibility and how are these parties positioned?
- x. How good is our level of knowledge in the matter? Are there unknown facts? How far has our research and that of our rival advanced?

an immediate, obvious threat from a rival.^{“ii} Every professional avoids these errors in championship matches. Reason enough to ask the team in a crisis situation, the question regarding immediate threats. The counter-check for error prevention resides in the area of psychology.

Phases

Valuable clues can emerge from assigning to a phase. “Each player pursues three main goals in the opening: 1) character development 2) securing the king 3) attaining control of the centre.”^{“iii}

For crisis communication this means:

1) Are all necessary resources, e.g. for internal research, mobilised? According to the author in the opening phase of a crisis (as in chess) the distribution of success factors corresponds to Pareto distribution (80/20 principle): a few essential factors decide on victory or defeat. The time or respectively “development” factor is in most cases one of the most important factors. In many cases crisis communication fails because internal provision of information and countermeasures are slower than the media.

2) In the start phase, public statements by the top leading figure of an organisation should be the exception rather than the rule.

y. What cannot be allowed to happen under any circumstances?

z. Which plots (variants) could arise with sufficient probability?

3) Depending on the type of crisis, there are central themes or functional public principles, which can decide the interpretational sovereignty in the overall crisis. These important fields should be identified quickly and brought under control.

Most chess games are decided in the middle game. The dynamics arising from attack, defence, positional play and tactical and positional elements, occasionally require several novel situation assessments. The same applies to crisis, and the staff must regularly ask the question: "Is the situation assessment still current or must it be renewed?"

Attack: When we transfer the attack experiences from a chess video game to crisis communication, one of the most significant things to note is: an attack only has a chance of succeeding when at least some elements of the position are indicative of this. If these prerequisites are missing, this must be apparent in the process of situation assessment so that the defence focuses there.. The same applies in reverse for a relief attack. To assess an attack it is generally important to be clear on at least four points:

1. Why does one side have the initiative? For example by repeatedly making direct threats so that the defendant has no chance to get his own position and thoughts sorted out in order to repel the at-

tack.

2. The attacker must be prepared to absorb enemy contact: How does this happen? In chess, open lines and diagonals play a role. In what ways does this occur in a crisis?
3. Is removing defenders or attackers a threat? In a crisis this can be: advocates, witnesses for the defence, incriminating or exonerating issues, camera-suitable protagonists etc.
4. Compelling (more) weaknesses. One of the most important tasks of situation assessment is to follow up on these questions particularly carefully so that the correct plan and the right tactical measures are found.

During an attack there are two essential factors for success and correspondingly for assessment. The balance of power around the attack site and the state of defence, e.g.: Dozens of established paediatricians and employees complain publicly about a children's clinic. The (unjustly but nevertheless disliked) clinic management however shows that it is acting correctly by using figures, data and facts. But the public would rather believe the numerous critics: because the balance of power of voices dominates in numerical terms and because the image of the disliked management is already tarnished, therefore the "defence wall" has been dam-

aged. Knowledge of the game of chess can easily be transferred to crisis communication^{iv}: “If the king is badly exposed and has gathered too few defenders around him, all that’s needed now is an attack with more modest forces ... in order to decide the game. Mostly however, the king is shielded by several defence pieces and a solid front of pawns. In this case the attacker must create considerable superiority on the spot if he wants to be successful. The result is that the probability of success increases with the number of attack figures.”

When the situation assessment is made as per the outline presented here, analysis will always show whether the attack has sufficient substance. Experience tells us that in chess, one of the most common errors of attack is to start an attack with forces that are really inadequate for success. The most frequent analogy between chess and crisis communication might be the unresearched story, which unleashes a medium in search of a quick scoop.

If this becomes clear after the attack has begun (after the first allegations), the deciding question is often whether the media succeeds in mobilising reserves: for example, when more critical voices come forward after initial reporting. Experienced editors already have additional resources positioned (sources etc.) before irreversibly sounding the attack.

	<p><u>Defence:</u> The crisis communicator usually adopts the role of defender – at least until he can switch to counterattack. Many principles of defence are the antithesis of attacking principles. But there is an important difference: defenders are the target of an attack and this has varying psychological consequences. Due to the particular significance, psychology is dealt with in a separate section. Basically: defence is more difficult than attack. The defender mostly moves around on the edge, doing nothing more than to wait patiently for the attacker to slip up. “When a chance comes up, the defender must recognise it and grasp the opportunity. ... attackers essentially take more notice of their own tactical chances than of those of their opponent.”^V</p> <p>When on the attack, the attacker always becomes committed, in a manner of speaking. The same applies to editing, from the moment when the request is made or reported. This corresponds somewhat to what is known in chess as (material or positional) concession. Situation assessment keeps track of the question as to which concessions and guidelines there were, so that, in terms of measures to take, they can be referred to later, if necessary.</p>
<p>III. Psychology</p> <p>a. Are those people addressed by the charges currently all capable of acting (physically absent, traumatised, prejudiced)?</p>	<p>Crisis communication means influencing the awareness, thinking and acting of people. Here, knowledge of modern chess psychology can be employed in a whole range of areas: recognising your own strengths and</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> b. Are the decision makers trained in working with crises and do they have relevant practical experience? c. What is at stake for whom? d. How does each stakeholder group perceive the charges? Does the news not only spark interest but also dismay, outrage or even fear in public? What effect will that have on the subjective perception? e. Empirically, does the number of erroneous decisions rise in a crisis situation (error rate or respectively so-called “inexplicable“ errors): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Which measures are taken? ii. Is the issue being under- or overestimated? Carelessness / negligence? Blinker phenomenon? iii. Is your own position being under- or overestimated? iv. During a crisis, external emotionality (victims, media) is falsely confronted by the management of the organisation in that it retreats to legal positions, information refusal, unreasonable aggressivity/passivity: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What is the current status? 2. Is it ensured that attorney correspondence or similar leaves 	<p>weaknesses, unrealistic striving for perfection (even despite time shortage), indecisiveness, over- and underestimating your own and rival players, coping with emotions, lack of patience, boosting stamina (in particular in unpleasant situations) and concentration, overcoming defeat or victory or respectively setbacks, rashness, obsessiveness and holding on to unrealistic plans, decision making on questions such as choosing between the objectively best course of action or the most disadvantageous for opponents or respectively the most popular course of action with the public and media. The psychology section should also complement objective situation assessment with the question of whether the realistically best plan can also be implemented using your own strength or whether it is not sustainable due to the now excessive (public, political, personal) pressure on the participants.</p> <p>Healthy common sense and the relativity of objective measures depends on those participating and judging: Albert Einstein called the first chess world master, Emanuel Lasker, an “extremely productive person.“ Lasker himself established something like the theory of relativity of the chess move, in a field today designated as chess psychology. Lasker evaluated plans and manoeuvres not only according to the “objective truth“ of the situation on the board, but also depending on the personality of his rival. He played not only against the</p>
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<p>the office only after being released by the communications manager?</p> <p>v. Misconduct for psychological reasons, for instance distorted perceptions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Threat from rash actions in seemingly desperate / dead-end situation? 2. "Blindness" – overlooking obvious threats? 3. Residual image: sustained notional retention of the image of the previous position/situation in the new situation. Only residual images of individual circumstances of the previous situation can be transferred, if needed. 4. Inflexible image: estimations of specific issues are considered final and unalterable. 5. Anticipated image: occurs from analysis of prospective scenarios and courses of action. The scenario is overvalued so that conceivable threats / consequences already seem real and are treated correspond- 	<p>pieces of the opponents, but also – and sometimes in particular – against their personality and psyche.^{vii} The relevance for crisis communication is obvious. Therefore, naturally and meant in the best sense, the first psychological question in a crisis situation must be asked in terms of the capacity to act of those persons against whom charges have been made. This is all the more valid if this concerns very high-level decision-makers who (can) influence the way the organisation acts in crisis.</p> <p>Misconduct for psychological reasons</p> <p>Chess psychology has a large collection of cases particularly in terms of <u>inexplicable errors</u> such as <u>overlooking obvious threats</u>. Even world champions are not immune to this. Residual images as well as anticipated and inflexible images are viewed as the original cause: with the so-called residual image a feature of a situation or if possible the overall situation assessment of the current situation during analysis, is transferred to a future position, where not everyone is aware that this has since changed. Similarly, in the case of the anticipated image, the anticipated sequence events is imposed strongly in the current appraisal of the situation, as though this development might already have occurred. The same applies to the inflexible image, which leads</p>
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<p>ingly. This often results in overlooking immediate threats.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Cognitive dissonances (propensity to acknowledge) ignore factors, which contradict earlier convictions. 7. Anchor and other heuristics: anchor: specific information that is fixed in the memory, (anchor^{vi}) influences perception of further information. 8. Loss aversion: possession or respectively the “known” is more highly valued than potential gains. 9. Blackouts? Fatigue / satiation? 10. Internal indiscretions? (whistleblower) <p>vi. Look in the mirror:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Is obstinacy a threat? (not admitting to a mistake) 2. Is embellishment of an objective grievance a threat? 3. Is head-in-the-sand syndrome a threat? 4. Excessive involvement of feelings? (anger, fear, euphoria, dejection) 	<p>us to believe that we have already achieved our own goals. In chess psychology the above images serve as an explanation model for particularly obvious cases of “chess blindness” – of particularly inexplicable errors.^{viii}</p> <p>In contrast to chess, in a struggle between two individuals, crisis communication can combat the problem of images quite well: It is recommended to assign the task of devil’s advocate to two members of the team. This duo ideally comprises an experienced publicist and a crafty investigative journalist engaged mostly as an external advisor.</p> <p>Another (all too human) source of misconduct is the ubiquitous inclination of justifying our own actions and even our obvious mistakes.^{ix} “This striving for consistency was scrutinised in the area of social psychology in terms of the theory of <u>cognitive dissonance</u>. “... Cognitive dissonance is a state of conflict a person lives through <i>after</i> making a decision, taking an action or coming into contact with information which contradicts convictions, feelings and values.”^x Depending on the hierarchical position of the person affected by the charges, it is difficult to cope with this problem. From the second level, it is recommended that a long-serving and well-respected member of the board of directors be brought into the crisis team as a moralistic instance (silverback effect / “angel’s advocate”).</p> <p><u>Tackle the opponent, not the pieces</u>, is a well-known</p>
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<p>5. Striving for unreasonable perfection (often ends in time shortage)</p> <p>6. Should / must we deviate from the company style during a crisis?</p> <p>f. Tackle the opponent, not the pieces.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Do we know someone who knows the editor particularly well? (specific publicist, ex-colleague, friendly editor colleague etc.) ii. What else is the journalist reporting on? iii. How does the editor embark on research to begin a story? iv. How does the editor compile his texts / articles ? v. Are the entries at the beginning of the texts / articles repeated / similar? vi. Do speaker colleagues or own contacts in the editing office know of failures, which the editor recently had to accept? (cease-and-desist declaration, revocation, exclusive stories, which others snatched away from him) vii. Which successes and failures has the journalist had in recent months? What is his general reputation? viii. Does the journalist show a liking for 	<p>saying in chess: “Only an machine plays the same way against every opponent. The practical chess player explores the strengths and weaknesses of his opponent ... In the build-up to a world championship match, a player sometimes spends months on a thorough study of the games of his opponent. He searches for weaknesses in his opening strategy, notes the types of positions in which his opponent feels comfortable or not ...^{xi}“ Similarly, it is self-evident to analyse not only the facts triggering a crisis, but also the role of the protagonists. A prerequisite for psychological action with respect to third parties is a reasonable look in the mirror to observe the psychological strengths and weaknesses within our own organisation and within the management team.</p>
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<p>specific details or perspectives? (technique, processes, figures, manager perspective, employee perspective, political viewpoints etc.)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ix. Is the journalist acquainted with our field? x. Strengths and weaknesses of the journalistic craft? xi. How thoroughly does the editor usually research? xii. Does the journalist continue to end up with too little time for his research because the matter is pushed aside until just before deadline? xiii. How good is the journalist's networking within our organisation in general? Control committees? (such as board, employee representation) xiv. How much can the journalist endure? xv. Are there other relevant characteristics? <p>g. Tenacity, sustainability, substance: has the pertinent organisation / department researched and presented all required facts FULLY or were important details forgotten internally or perhaps misunderstood?</p> <p>h. Psychological balance following shock? Confidence?</p>	
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<p>IV. Strategic goals, relevant stratagems, development of a plan, strategy and tactics</p> <p>a. Is there an optimal run of events and how can it be achieved?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Can we take the initiative through morally excellent and surprising conduct? ii. Can premature success be brought about in the development phase or respectively the hot phase of the crisis? iii. If the opponent commits an error, challenge the opponent, not the pieces (see above). iv. How can we gain time? [not to be confused with waiting games] Can a secondary battlefield be opened up on which reporting is concentrated (if only for one day) until we have researched the main issue and taken measures? v. Can we take the initiative and shape future media content? How is a more enterprising process conceivable? vi. Can further unnecessary complexities be avoided? (for instance, because we have now regained the advantage): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. don't allow any more counter-play 	<p>According to the situation assessment, strategic goals and a plan are developed, given the psychological aspects and anticipation of the most probable developments in the issue. Only then is the choice of tactics made, in other words the concrete measures, actions and statements as well as an estimation of the reactions of third parties and the public.</p> <p>Goal deduction, plan and development of tactical measures are a broad field. The circumstances specifically determined in the situation assessment and especially the evaluation thereof, determine realistically which options we have in a crisis.</p> <p>Example: The goal of research has a "development edge" (for instance because we have heard ahead of time, of research done by an individual editor for a weekly print or TV format). If we make use of the tactical equipment from the chess game, this advantage can be used in several aspects. Using the development edge we can influence the balance of power in our favour, by addressing plausible sources and taking a stance on the side of the journalist in order to gain his support.</p> <p>Here, our own headlong rush into the sacrificial attack comes into consideration, for example, by approaching an editor proficient in matters of faster media (TV news format, radio, news agency) and telling him "our" story</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2. avoid unclear manoeuvres 3. act carefully to the very end 4. neither hurry nor delay anything? 5. can the situation be simplified? Such as by reducing the attackers ("trade-off")? vii. Are there at least some counter opportunities in the debate? viii. Shall we rather take advantage of the weaknesses in the argument of the media/attackers? ix. Should we rather rely on the strengths of our argument? Dominance of concepts? x. Dialogue strategy, humour strategy? xi. Deviation b. What may not be allowed to happen in any case? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Do nothing senseless 1. Media amateurs or lawyers to decide on assertions and wording. 2. Legal writings could lead to media damage. Communications department does not release attorney correspondence if it receives these writ- 	<p>ourselves. The remaining time (mostly only a matter of days or hours) is sacrificed until the actual publication as planned by the "attacker". We can partly determine the time and place of discussion: above all, we decide which aspect of the story will be told first and which journalist will publish it first. There is further compensation in that we have the chance to tell the full story all at once, so that gradual rotation with headlines for days on end becomes less probable. If that proves unfeasible due to circumstances, more information has been prepared as an option in the following days, which journalists could use for turning the story in a less unpleasant direction.</p> <p>A more psychological approach is also conceivable: for instance if we know from research in the editing office and archives, that it has been retrospectively proven that the editor has, in the past months, made errors in a number of stories or even if his reports have been refuted. Then it sometimes suffices to reveal two or three contradictions in the statements of his sources or in the issue. Therefore, we turn to the author early on (before he has even asked the organisation) and confront him with these facts.</p> <p>The section "Strategic goals, relevant stratagems, development of a plan" is a very comprehensive field. A short comment (as present) inevitably appears inade-</p>
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<p>ings prior to dispatch.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. Insubstantial statements and objections (e.g. “no comment“) 4. Chaos via contradictory testaments 5. Victim or respectively critical scolding 6. Media scolding 7. Are dubious alternatives being considered? 8. Is passivity / slacking a threat? <p>ii. Other developments to be avoided</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Misconduct due to psychological reasons (see above) 2. Reactions morally vulnerable? 3. Is time shortage a threat due to slow reaction / research / flight behaviour of individuals in the organisation? 4. Errors in the beginning phase 5. Errors in the hot phase 	<p>quate here. This section is the content of a more detailed publication planned for 2012. The questions given here should however give at least some clues for the development of a useful plan.</p>
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ⁱ Vergleiche die Merkmale der Stellungsbewertung in **Anatoli Karpow, Anatoli Mazukewitsch**: Stellungsbewertung und Plan. Zürich: Edition Olms, 2007, S. 19: „1. Materielles Kräfteverhältnis. 2. Vorhandensein unmittelbarer Drohungen. 3. Lage der Könige (ihre Gefährdung). 4. Beherrschung offenerer Linien. 5. Bauernstruktur, schwache und starke

Felder. 6. Zentrum und Raum. 7. Entwicklung und Anordnung der Figuren. Anhand dieser sieben Kriterien vergleicht der Schachspieler seine Möglichkeiten mit denen des Gegners. Er bewertet die Stellung und leitet daraus seinen Plan ab. Danach sucht er konkrete Züge und berechnet Varianten.“

ⁱⁱ **Marion Bönsch-Kauk**: Nervenkrieg – von Aura bis Zweikampf. Angewandte Psychologie für Trainer, Schachlehrer und Spieler. Berlin: Frank & Timme, 2008, S. 197

ⁱⁱⁱ **John Nunn**: Schach verstehen. Zug um Zug. London: Gambit Publications 2002, S. 9

^{iv} Vgl. **John Nunn**, a. a. O., Seite 51

^v Vgl. **John Nunn**, a. a. O., Seite 97f sowie zum Spiel insbesondere wesentlich schlechteren bzw. verlorenen Positionen Seite 123f und

Simon Webb: Schach für Tiger. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1985, S. 67 („Fortuna begünstigt die Glücklichen“)

^{vi} Vergleiche **Philip Zimbardo, Richard Gerrig**: Psychologie. 18. Auflage. München: Pearson, 2008 mit einer auch für Laien verständlichen allgemeinen Einführung in die Psychologie sowie insbesondere zu Heuristiken das Kapitel 8.5. Für Anker: Seite 315-116

^{vii} **Emanuel Lasker / Reinhard Munzert**: Gesunder Menschenverstand im Schach. Relativität im Schach. Berlin, 1925 / Hollfeld, 2004 (2. Auflage), S. 179f. Der einzige deutsche und erste Schachweltmeister, Emanuel Lasker, wurde an Heiligabend (24. Dezember) 1868 in Berlinchen (Neumark) geboren und zog im Alter von elf Jahren zu seinem Bruder nach Berlin.

^{viii} **Nikolai Krogius**: Psychologie im Schach. Berlin (Ost): Sportverlag, 1983, S. 57ff sowie **Marion Bönsch-Kauk** a.a.O., S. 199ff

^{ix} **Carol Tavis, Elliot Aronson**: Ich habe recht, also wenn ich mich irre. München: Riemann Verlag, 2010.

^x **Philip Zimbardo, Richard Gerrig**: a. a. O. S. 649 sowie für Kognitive Dissonanzen insbesondere das gesamte Kapitel 16 „Soziale Kognition und Beziehungen“ mit den Abschnitten 16.1 Die Konstruktion der sozialen Realität und 16.2 Einstellungen, Einstellungsänderungen und Handlungen

^{xi} **Simon Webb**, a. a. O., S. 12